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____________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
  The issues presented are whether workers' compensation 
benefits for specific loss of use of a particular body part 
constitute "disability" benefits for purposes of offset against 
Social Security Disability Insurance ("SSDI") benefits and 
whether workers' compensation for one injury may be offset 
against SSDI benefits for a separate, unrelated injury.  We 
conclude that the compensation paid is a disability benefit, and 
that offset is appropriate even if the benefits arise from 
unrelated injuries or disabilities. 
 
 
 I. 
  On January 27, 1989, plaintiff Joseph Krysztoforski 
injured his left ankle and foot and was awarded weekly worker's 
compensation benefits of $ 306.66.  See 77 Pa.C.S.A. § 101, et 
seq.  His ankle improved, and he planned to return to work.   
  On October 27, 1989, he suffered a cerebral vascular 
accident ("stroke"), leaving him permanently paralyzed and unable 
to speak.  As a result of the effects of his stroke, plaintiff 
received SSDI benefits of $ 852.70 per month from the onset date 
of October 27, 1989.  According to the formula in 42 U.S.C. § 
  
424a, his worker's compensation payments were subtracted from his 
SSDI benefits. 
  He continued to receive workers' compensation benefits 
for his ankle and foot injury until early November 1990 when 
plaintiff and his employer stipulated that this disability had 
resolved into a specific loss of the use of his left foot, and he 
was awarded $ 306.66 per week for 250 weeks from December 5, 
1990.  He requested these payments in a lump sum of $ 76,665.00, 
which he was granted on December 6, 1990. 
  After plaintiff received his lump sum award, the 
Secretary, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 424a(b), prorated the lump sum 
at $ 260.66 per week through September 1995, for a total of 250 
weeks, and continued to offset that amount against his SSDI 
benefits.  Plaintiff objected to the offset which was affirmed 
upon reconsideration.  He filed a timely request for a hearing 
before the administrative law judge ("ALJ") who determined that 
the offset was proper. 
  The Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for 
review of the ALJ's decision which became the final decision of 
the Secretary.  Having exhausted his administrative remedies, 
plaintiff appealed to federal district court which had 
jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and adopted a magistrate 
judge's report and recommendation to affirm the ALJ's decision.  
Plaintiff has filed a timely notice of appeal to this court.  We 
exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
  
 
 II. 
  The court must accept the ALJ's factual findings if 
there is substantial evidence to support them.  Van Horn v. 
Schweiker, 717 F.2d 871, 873 (3d Cir. 1983).  Our review is 
plenary as to the Secretary's application of the law.  Wilkerson 
v. Bowen, 828 F.2d 117, 119 (3d Cir. 1987). 
 
 
 III. 
  The Social Security Act ("Act") provides that any 
person who is "disabled" as defined in the Act is eligible for 
SSDI benefits.  42 U.S.C. § 423(a).  The Secretary determined 
that plaintiff is disabled and eligible for benefits.  However, 
the Act limits the amount of benefits an individual may receive 
from both SSDI and workers' compensation.  42 U.S.C. § 424a; 
Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971).   
  Section 424a provides in pertinent part: 
 
  (a) If for any month prior to the month in 
which an individual attains the age of 65 -- 
   (1) such individual is entitled to 
benefits under section 423 of this 
title, and 
   (2) such individual is entitled for 
such month to -- 
   (A) periodic benefits on account of 
his or her total or partial 
disability (whether or not 
permanent) under a workmen's 
compensation law or plan of the 
United States or a State, . . . . 
   the total of his benefits under 
section 423 of this title for such 
month . . . based on his wages and 
  
self-employment income shall be 
reduced (but not below zero) by the 
amount by which the sum of -- 
   (3) such total of benefits under 
section[] 423 . . . of this title 
for such month, and  
   (4) such periodic benefits payable 
(and actually paid) for such month 
to such individual under such laws 
or plans, exceeds the higher of -- 
   (5) 80 per centum of his "average 
current earnings", or 
   (6) the total of such individual's 
disability insurance benefits under 
section 423 of this title for such 
month . . . based on his wages and 
self-employment income, prior to 
reduction under this section. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 424a(a). 
  As a preliminary matter, we hold that federal law 
governs in determining whether a workers' compensation loss-of-
use award should be offset against SSDI benefits.  Section 424a 
does not refer or defer to state law for the determination of 
whether a person's periodic workers' compensation benefits are 
subject to offset.  Plaintiff's claim that Pennsylvania law 
applies to the issue of whether the offset itself is appropriate 
is without merit, but we agree with plaintiff that we should look 
to state law to inform the nature of the workers' compensation 
payments, particularly whether the benefits were for "total or 
partial disability . . . under a workmen's compensation law or 
plan."  42 U.S.C. § 424a(a)(2)(A).  Neither the statute nor the 
regulations provide a definition of "disability" for purposes of 
§ 424a.  "Where Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled 
  
meaning under either equity or the common law, a court must 
infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means 
to incorporate the established meaning of these terms."  NLRB v. 
Amax Coal Co., Div. of Amax, Inc., 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981). 
  The Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act ("Act") 
provides benefits for three general classifications of injured 
workers:  (1) total disability under § 306(a) of the Act, 77 
Pa.C.S.A. § 511; (2) partial disability under § 306(b); 77 
Pa.C.S.A. § 512; and (3) disability from permanent injuries of 
certain classes under § 306(c), 77 Pa.C.S.A. § 513.  Plaintiff's 
benefits arose from § 513 which provides in pertinent part: 
 
  For all disability resulting from permanent 
injuries of the following classes, the 
compensation shall be exclusively as follows: 
  . . . (4) For the loss of a foot, sixty-six 
and two-thirds per centum of wages during two 
hundred fifty weeks. 
 
77 Pa.C.S.A. § 513. 
  Plaintiff claims that benefits for specific loss of use 
of his foot do not constitute disability benefits.  He asserts 
that he was entitled to his workers' compensation "whether or not 
he had missed any time from gainful employment" and that this is 
contrary to the purpose of disability payments -- to compensate 
for lost earning potential.  Pltf. Br. at 7.  Plaintiff refers to 
§ 513 as compensating "statutory disability."  He argues the 
specific loss workers' compensation benefits were not paid for 
any actual disability and hence were not disability benefits. 
  
  Pennsylvania workers' compensation case law has defined 
"disability" as "'the loss, total or partial, of earning power'" 
resulting from a work-related injury.  Kachinski v. Workmen's 
Compensation Appeal Bd. (Vepco Constr. Co.), 516 Pa. 240, 248 
(1987)(quoting Woodward v. Pittsburgh Engineering and 
Construction Co., 293 Pa. 338, 340 (1928)).  Although plaintiff 
is correct that permanent injury benefits are not dependent upon 
loss of earnings, § 513 benefits encompass "all disability" which 
may arise from a permanent injury, including inability to work if 
such were to result from the injury.  See Killian v. Heintz Div. 
Kelsey Hayes, 468 Pa. 200, 204-06 (Pa. 1976).   
  Thus, "by awarding benefits even where there is no 
actual loss of earnings, § 306(c) [§ 513] creates a presumption 
that there is disability associated with a specific loss."  Sun 
Oil Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Davis), 144 Pa. 
Commw. 51, 54-55 (Pa.Comm.Ct. 1991); see also Davidson v. 
Sullivan, 942 F.2d 90, 95 (1st Cir. 1991)(a statutorily 
prescribed award for permanent injury "compensates for a 
conclusively presumed wage loss" and is subject to offset).  This 
interpretation makes sense given that a worker who suffers a 
permanent injury is not able to recover separately for loss of 
use under § 513 and for loss of earnings.  See Carnevali v. 
Heckler, 616 F.Supp. 1500, 1504 (W.D.Pa. 1985)("Compensation 
received under 77 P.S. § 513 makes an individual ineligible for 
  
partial or total disability compensation under 77 P.S. § [sic.] 
511 and 512").   
  Although plaintiff emphasizes the fact that a worker 
could receive § 513 benefits and continue to work at her job, § 
513 permanent injury benefits clearly include compensation in the 
event of lost earnings and hence constitute disability benefits 
for purposes of offset under § 424a. 
  Plaintiff mentions Senator Edward M. Kennedy's 
criticism of offsetting permanent injury benefits during debate 
of the Social Security Amendments of 1965.  However, the 
Senator's comments were not incorporated into the statute, and as 
the First Circuit remarked, the "'unfortunate effects'" of 
reducing the worker's benefits were "contemplated by the offset 
provision as enacted, notwithstanding Senator Kennedy's 
criticism."  Davidson, 942 F.2d at 96. 
  We now turn to examining whether workers' compensation 
benefits for one injury may be offset against SSDI benefits for a 
separate, unrelated injury.  If the language of the statute is 
clear, we need not look to the legislative history.  Barnes v. 
Cohen, 749 F.2d 1009, 1013 (3d Cir. 1984)(citations omitted), 
cert. denied sub nom. Cohen v. Betson, 471 U.S. 1061 (1985).  A 
plain reading of § 424a calls for offset regardless of whether 
the benefits derived from identical or different injuries.  The 
statute simply does not make such distinctions.  See Kananen v. 
Matthews, 555 F.2d 667, 670 (8th Cir. 1977)("No portion of § 424a 
  
limits its application to payments for a disability caused by the 
same physical or mental condition"); Campbell, 14 F.3d at 428 
(following Kananen, supra). 
  As we noted in Sciarotta v. Bowen, 
 
  Congress enacted § 424a because of concern 
about the concurrent receipt by many injured 
workers of both federal disability benefits 
and state workers' compensation benefits.  
See S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 
reprinted in 1965 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. 
News 1943, 2040 . . . . [T]he [Senate 
committee's] report makes clear that "the 
committee believes that it is desirable as a 
matter of sound principle to prevent the 
payment of excessive combined benefits."  Id. 
at 2040. 
 
837 F.2d 135, 138 (3d Cir. 1988).  The clear intent of the 
statute was to preserve and protect a level of income for the 
disabled employee while avoiding a duplication of benefits 
irrespective of the cause of the disability.  Accordingly we 
conclude that the offset at issue was proper.1 
  As to plaintiffs' argument that it was unreasonably 
excessive and harsh for the ALJ to prorate his lump sum award of 
$ 76,665.00 through September 1995, instead of over the course of 
his employment lifetime, we decline to entertain his argument 
                     
 
   1  In addition, plaintiff consistently refers to his workers' 
compensation benefits as a "lump sum," but there is no doubt that 
the lump sum award is "periodic benefits on account of his or her 
total or partial disability."  42 U.S.C. § 424a(a)(2).  The lump 
sum award arose from plaintiff's own request to commute his 250 
weeks of compensation.  The Act specifically authorizes proration 
of commuted periodic payments.  42 U.S.C. § 424a(b). 
  
since it was not raised before the ALJ or the district court.  
See, e.g., Salvation Army v. Department of Community Affairs, 919 
F.2d 183, 196 (3d Cir. 1990); Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 
1019 (9th Cir. 1992); Keating v. Secretary of Health and Human 
Services, 848 F.2d 271, 275 (1st Cir. 1988).  Plaintiff contends 
that we permitted the appellant in Sciarotta to raise a 
miscalculated proration allegation for the first time.  His 
assertion is misleading:  the appellant had raised the 
miscalculation issue before the district court, Sciarotta, 647 
F.Supp. 132, 136 n.4 (D.N.J. 1986), and we reached the issue, 
noting that the district court "did not reach the miscalculation 
argument in the original proceedings," having disposed of the 
case on other grounds.  837 F.2d at 141 n. 9. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 IV. 
 
  For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the district 
court's affirmance of the Secretary's final determination. 
 __________________ 
 
 
